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Abstract
We propose a new low-complexity coalition forming al-
gorithm, BSCA-F, that enables agents to negotiate bilateral
Shapley value stable coalitions in uncertain environments,
and demonstrate its usefulness by example. In particular,
we show that utilizing the possibilistic mean value for de-
fuzzifying negotiated fuzzy agent payoffs is reasonable, and
fuzzy ranking methods can be utilized to implement opti-
mistic, or pessimistic strategies of individual agents.
1 Introduction
Game-theoretic coalition algorithms can be used by intelli-
gent agents as coordination means in a variety of applica-
tions in different environments. Classic approaches such as
in [12, 8] proposed solutions to the problem of how self-
interested agents best form stable coalitions in the sense
of cooperative game theory. However, negotiation during
the coalition-forming process might be uncertain. Such
uncertainties could be caused by the possibility of nonde-
terministic events that hamper the negotiation process and
produce incomplete information. Agents might have un-
certain knowledge about the share of coalition income in
which they intend to participate or on the degree of their
membership in one or multiple coalitions. An agent might
determine the degree of its membership to potential coali-
tions by individually leveled commitments to other agents
or bargains that indicate the degree of collaboration that the
agents desire. The ﬁrst case might imply the formation of
fuzzy-valued coalitions, whereas the second case might in-
duce the formation of fuzzy coalitions, which might par-
tially overlap. In this paper, we focus on negotiations of
game-theoreticallystable fuzzy-valued coalitions.
In [5], agents learn about each other in a way that allows
foruncertainenvironmentalknowledgeanddifferentexpec-
tations of coalition values by different agents. However,
coalitionstabilityis basedontheexponentialBayesianCore
which may be empty in certain cases. [9] present a heuris-
tic approach that avoids computing stable payoffs in the
sense of cooperative game theory at all. Based on the work
of [10], in [1] a possibilistic fuzzy extension of the Kernel
is deﬁned that allows agents to negotiate fuzzy Kernel sta-
ble coalitions with low polynomial complexity. However,
the reduction in computational complexity strictly depends
on the maximum size of coalitions allowed.
In this paper, we propose an alternative algorithm, BSCA-
F, that allow agents to negotiate fuzzy-valued coalitions in
the setting of possibility theory. The BSCA-F does not
require to constrain coalition sizes for negotiations of low
computational and communication complexity. To achieve
this, we utilize the fuzzy bilateral Shapley value which,
however, implies that, in general, only subgame-stability
can be achieved. We show that it is reasonable to utilize
the possibilistic mean value [3] for defuzzifying the nego-
tiated fuzzy payoffs to implement unambiguous coalition
contracts among the agents.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
2 Background
We extend game-theoretic concepts of coalition theory by
means of possibilistic interpretation of fuzzy coalition val-
ues [10], and fuzzy ranking methods. Possibility theory
[13, 7] evolved from a possibilistic interpretation of fuzzy
set theory. There is empirical evidence for that people per-
form rather possibilistic than probablistic reasoning though
their subjective assessment of the probability and possibil-
ity of real world events closely coincide [11]. Possibilistic
interpretation of any fuzzy quantity indicates the degree of
its possibilitybutnot the probabilisticdegreeof its truth. As
a consequence, by modeling uncertainty in terms of fuzzy
quantities negotiating agents may ignore certain situations
they either do not understand, or are simply not interested
in, rather than being enforced to assign individual probabil-
ity values to each of them.2.1 Fuzzy Quantities
Inthe following,we deﬁne fuzzyquantities, operations,and
ranking methods that are needed to understand the notion
fuzzy-valued coalition game we introduce in subsequent
section. For more details, we refer the reader to, for ex-
ample, [10, 1].
Deﬁnition 2.1 A fuzzy subset   s of a set S is deﬁned by its
membershipfunctionµe s : S  → [0,1]where µe s(x),x∈ S is
called the degree of membership or membership value of x
inS. x ∈   s iff µe s(x) > 0, with support(  s): ={x| x ∈   s}.
µe s(x) is also called possibility distribution for X (Π(X =
x)), if it denotes the degree of possibility that variable X of
domain S takes the value x. Any fuzzy subset of R is called
a fuzzy quantity.
Deﬁnition 2.2 Let   x a fuzzy quantity;   R the set of all fuzzy
quantities.
1. size(  x): =s u p {support(  x)}−inf{support(  x)}
2.   x is normalized iff supx∈R{µe x(x)} =1
3. x ∈ R with µe x(x)=m a x y∈R (µe x(y)) is a modal
value of   x.
4.   r,r ∈ R denotes a fuzzy quantity with
µe r(x)=
 
1 if x = r
0 otherwise ,x∈ R
5. Afuzzyinterval   I isafuzzyquantitywith∀x1,x 2,x 3 ∈
R,x 1 <x 2 <x 3 : µe I(x2) ≥ min(µe I(x1),µe I(x3))
6. A trapezoid fuzzy interval (   (x1,x 2,x 3,x 4)), x1, x2,
x3, x4 ∈ R is a fuzzy interval with ∀r ∈ R:
µ
(   (x1,x2,x3,x4))(r)=

  
  
1 if x2 ≤ r ≤ x3
r−x1
x2−x1 if x1 <r<x 2
x4−r
x4−x3 if x3 <r<x 4
0 otherwise
Arithmetic operations on fuzzy quantities follow Zadeh’s
extension principle.
Deﬁnition 2.3 Let   x ∈   Rn,n ∈ N. The function
  f :   Rn  →   R is called a fuzzy extension of a func-
tion f : Rn  → R iff ∀x ∈ Rn : µe f(e x)(x)=
supy∈Rn{min1≤i≤n{µe xi(yi)}|f(y)=x)} if f−1(x)  =
∅, and µ e f(e x)(x)=0if f−1(x)=∅.
Deﬁnition 2.4 Let F1,F 2 ∈ RF, x,y,z,a∈ R. Applying
the extension principle, we deﬁne
µF1⊕F2(x): =s u p {min(µF1(y),µ F2(z))|y + z = x}
µ−F1(x): =µF1(−x)
µF1 F2(x): =µF1⊕(−F2)(x)
µa·F1(x): =
 
µF1(x/a) if a  =0
µe 0 if a =0
Agents are supposed to negotiate coalitions with expected
fuzzy gains, hence to compute, compare, and select fuzzy
utility values. That, in particular, requires means of ranking
fuzzy quantities several of which being proposed for dif-
ferent applications such as in [2]. We adopt fuzzy quantity
ranking operators that have been introduced by Dubois and
Prade in the setting of possibility theory [6].
Deﬁnition 2.5 Let F1,F 2 ∈ RF, R a fuzzy subset of   R×  R.
R is a fuzzyrankingoperator,orfuzzysimilarityrelation,if
µR(F1,F 2) denotes the degree to which F1 is ”greater” or
”similar” than F2, respectively. Further, let G a fuzzy rank-
ing operator and S a fuzzy similarity relation. We deﬁne
(F1  ≥GF2): =µG(F1,F 2) and (F1  =SF2): =µS(F1,F 2).
RegardingthepossibilitydistributionsF1,F 2 ∈   R off1 and
f2, respectively, [6] deﬁne the
1. possibility of dominance   ≥P of f1 over f2 as Π(f1 ≥
f2)=F1  ≥PF2 =s u p {min(µF1(x),µ F2(y)) | x,y ∈
R,x≥ y};
2. necessity of dominance   ≥N of f1 over f2 as
N(f1 ≥ f2)= F1  ≥NF2 =i n f x{supy{max(1 −
µF1(x),µ F2(y)) | x,y ∈ R,x≥ y}};
3. possibility of strict dominance   >P of f1 over
f2 as Π(f1 >f 2)= F1 >P F2 =
supx{infy{min(µF1(x),1 − µF2(y)) | x,y ∈ R,x≤
y}};
4. necessity of strict dominance   >N of f1 over f2 as
N(f1 >f 2)=F1 >N F2 =i n f {max(1−µF1(x),1−
µF2(y)) | x,y ∈ R,x≤ y};
5. possibility of equality   =P of f1 and f2 as Π(f1 = f2)
= F1  =PF2 =m i n ( ( F1  ≥PF2),(F2  ≥PF1));
6. necessity of equality   =N of f1 and f2 as N(f1 = f2)
= F1  =NF2 = min(min(N(F2 ≥ F1),1 − Π(F2 >
F1)),min(N(F1 ≥ F2),1 − Π(F1 >F 2)))
A fuzzy set of maximal elements of a set X of fuzzy quan-
tities X, and fuzzylogical operators”AND” and ”OR” with
operands in [0,1] are deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.6 Let X a set of fuzzy quantities, G a fuzzy
ranking operator, x,y ∈ [0,1], n ∈ N.1. The fuzzy subset   max
GX of X is given by
µ g maxGX(F1): =m i n F2∈X,F2 =F1(F1  ≥GF2),F 1 ∈ X
denoting the degree to which F1 is a maximal element
of X.
2. The (crisp) set maxGX of maximal elements of X
is deﬁned as max
GX := {F | µmaxGX(F)=
maxµmaxGX}
3. x   
y := min(x,y), x   
y := max(x,y).
For    ∈{    
,    
}:    {  x1,...,  xn} :=  
  x   
 
  x2 ...
 
  xn−1     xn
 
...
  
Deﬁnition 2.7 For   x ∈   R, Lα(  x): ={x|x ∈ R,µ F(x) ≥
α} with α ∈ [0,1] is called an α-level cut of   x. We also
deﬁne Lα(  x∗ := inf{Lα(  x)} and Lα(  x∗ := sup{Lα(  x)}
Deﬁnition 2.8 Given a fuzzy interval   x ∈   R,with µ e X rep-
resenting a possibility distribution for a variable X ∈ R,
E(X): =
  1
0
α(Lα(  x)∗ + Lα(  x)∗)dα
is called the possibilistic mean value of X[3]. Instead of
E(X), we also write e(  x).
The additive possibilistic mean value e is similar to the ex-
pected value of stochastic variables used in probability the-
ory,thoughthere is nocommonagreementon the semantics
of exact degrees of possibility 1. Since e maps fuzzy mem-
bership functions to crisp real values, we consider it as an
appropriate method for defuzziﬁcation of fuzzy quantities
in the setting of possibility theory.
Remark 2.9 For any trapezoid fuzzy interval   I =
(   (x1,x 2,x 3,x 4)),, x1, x2, x3, x4 ∈ R,
e(  I)=
x1 + x2 + x3 + x4
4
=
x2+x3
2 + x1+x4
2
2
This form makes clear that for trapezoid fuzzy intervals, e
is the real value in   I minimizing the average distance to
the bounds of the most possible values [x2,x 3] of   I and the
bounds of the support (x1,x 4), i.e. the values that are pos-
sible at all. In this sense, e can also be considered as a
possibilistic error minimizing defuzziﬁcation method.
2.2 Fuzzy Coalition Games
Deﬁnition 2.10 A fuzzy coalition game (A,  v) consists of a
set of agents A, a fuzzy characteristic function   v :2 A  →   R,
and the membership function of the fuzzy quantities   v(C)
that might be interpreted as expectation of the common
coalition proﬁt that is to be distributed among its members.
1Carlsson and Fuller introduced a weighted version [4] of e which al-
lows for adjusting the importance of different possibility levels.
The worth   v(C) of a fuzzy-valuedcoalition C is a fuzzy set
of its possible real-valued coalitional proﬁts, represents a
possibilitydistributionof the real coalitionvaluev(C) ∈ R,
and has at least one modal value. If, for a given fuzzy coali-
tion game, the coalition value v(C) is equal to one modal
value of C for all possible coalitions C, it is equivalent to a
(deterministic) coalition game 2.
Deﬁnition 2.11 A fuzzy conﬁguration (C,   u) consists of a
(crisp) coalition structure C and fuzzy payoff distribution
  u : A  →   R.   u is called   =- efﬁcient to a degree of
µeff e =(  u): =
   
C∈C
 
⊕  
ai∈C
  u(ai)  =  v(C)
 
with fuzzy similarity relation   =.F o r a ∈Aand fuzzy
ranking operator   ≥, the degree of individual   ≥-rationality
(µindrat
e ≥(a)), and overall   ≥-rationality (µindrat
e ≥(  u))o f
the payoff distribution   u is deﬁned as   u(a)  ≥  v(a) and
   
a∈A{µindrat
e ≥(a)}, respectively.
The fuzzy Shapley value stable payoff distribution, intro-
duced in [10], is   ≥P-rational as well as   =P-efﬁcient with
degree 1 if the coalition values are normalized fuzzy inter-
vals. For reason of efﬁcient negotiation,we adopt the fuzzi-
ﬁed bilateral Shapley value for stable payoff distribution
among members of bilaterally formed fuzzy valued coali-
tions.
Deﬁnition 2.12 The fuzzy Shapley value   σ(a) of agent
a ∈A in a fuzzy game (A,  v) is   σ(a)=
 
C⊆A
⊕ (|A|−|C|)!(|C|−1)!
|A|! (  v(C) −   v(C \{ a})).
The fuzzy bilateral Shapley value   σb(C1 ∪ C2,C i,v ),
Ci,i∈{ 1,2} of the bilateral coalition C1 ∪ C2 is deﬁned
as the fuzzy Shapley value of Ci in the game ({C1,C 2},  v):
  σb(C1 ∪ C2,C i,  v): =
1
2
  v(Ci) ⊕
1
2
(  v(C1 ∪ C2)     v(Ck))
with k ∈{ 1,2},k = i.
Since the uncertainty denoted by   v(C1),   v(C2) and   v(C1 ∪
C2) is nowrepresentedbythe fuzzybilateral Shapleyvalue,
it requiresappropriatedefuzziﬁcationofthepayoffdistribu-
tion at the end of the coalition negotiations to enable crisp
side-payments among coalition members. If, for example,
coalition C1 ∪ C2 has been negotiated, the agents may de-
termine the crisp coalition value v(C1 ∪ C2) from the ac-
tual costs and rewards after having carried out the agreed
joint actions. However, the real coalition values v(C1) and
v(C2), in general, remain unknown to the agents, hence
need to be defuzziﬁed. For this purpose, we use a modiﬁed
2In the following, we use the term ”fuzzy game” instead of ”fuzzy
coalition game”.fuzzy bilateral Shapley value that uses coalition values of
subcoalitions defuzziﬁed by the possibilistic mean, which
leaves the fuzziness of the resulting payoffs to that of the
joint coalition value only.
Deﬁnition 2.13 The fuzzy bilateral Shapley value of given
fuzzy game (A,  v) with defuzziﬁed values of subcoalitions
  σe
b(C1 ∪ C2,C i,v ),Ci,i∈{ 1,2} in the bilateral coalition
C1 ∪ C2 is deﬁned as the fuzzy Shapley value of Ci in the
game ({C1 ∪ C2,C 1,C 2},  v). With k ∈{ 1,2},k = i,
  σ
e
b(Ci,  v): =
1
2
e(  v(Ci)) ⊕
1
2
(  v(C1 ∪ C2)   e(  v(Ck)))
Similar to the crisp bilateral Shapley value, we use a re-
cursive payoff distribution of the modiﬁed fuzzy bilateral
Shapley value based on the recursively bilateral formation
of coalition structures. Each agent maintains its individual
coalition history tree in due course of the bilateral negotia-
tions it participates in as member of a coalition.
Deﬁnition 2.14 The fuzzy payoff distribution   u within any
bilateral coalition C in a fuzzy game (A,  v) is called re-
cursively fuzzy bilateral Shapley value stable iff for ev-
ery non-leaf node C∗ of the coalition history tree TC :
u(C∗
i )=  σe
b(C∗,C ∗
i ,   vC∗),i∈ 1,2 with ∀C∗∗ ⊆A :
  vC∗(C∗∗)=



  σe
b(Cp,C
p
k,   vCp) if Cp ∈ TC,
C∗ = C
p
k,k∈ 1,2
  v(C∗∗) otherwise
For each coalition C ⊆A we deﬁne the fuzzy local
worth of individual agent a ∈ C as   lworthC(C∗): =
 
a∈C   lworth(C∗) with C∗ ⊆A ,C ⊆ C∗.   lwortha(C)
denotes the fuzzy gain of a for accomplishing its tasks in C
on behalf of its user or other agents in C, including costs.
Each coalition value is the sum of the local worth of each
of its members   v(C)=
 ⊕
a∈C   lwortha(C). Further, the
expected gain in utility of any potential bilateral coalition
candidate is the difference between what it may expect to
obtain in the coalition mergerin terms of the bilateral Shap-
ley value and its expected self-value.
Deﬁnition 2.15 For a fuzzy game (A,  v), the bilateral
Shapley value based expected utility gain of a subcoalition
C in the coalition C ∪ C∗,C,C∗ ⊂Ais
  ge v(C,C ∪ C
∗): =  σ
e
b(C ∪ C
∗,C,  v) − e(  v(C))
Lemma 2.16 Let a fuzzy game (A,  v) and C1,C 2 ⊂A .
Then   ge v(C1,C 1 ∪ C2)=  ge v(C2,C 1 ∪ C2)
Proof: By deﬁnitions 2.15 and 2.13, and because of the
properties of ⊕ and   when applied to at least one crisp
operand discussed e.g. in [7], we can rewrite
  ge v(C1,C 1 ∪ C2)
=
1
2
e(  v(C1)) ⊕
1
2
(  v(C1 ∪ C2)   e(  v(C2)))   e(  v(C1))
=
1
2
  v(C1 ∪ C2)  
1
2
e(  v(C2))  
1
2
e(  v(C1))
=
1
2
  v(C1 ∪ C2)  
1
2
e(  v(C1))  
1
2
e(  v(C2))
=   ge v(C2,C 1 ∪ C2)

3 Fuzzy-Valued Stable Coalition Negotiation
Algorithm 3.1 (BSCA-F).
Given A, initial conﬁguration (C0,   u0) with singleton sets
in C0 and   u0(a)=  v(a), fuzzy ranking operator   ◦∈
{  ≥P,   ≥N,   >P,   >N}, ranking threshold t, and negotiation
round counting variable r := 1. Further, each coalition de-
terminesitsrepresentativeRepC viavoting;representatives
are ranked according to given ascending order o : A  → N
of agents based on, for example, available computational
ressources.
Each agent a ∈ C ∈C r performs:
1. Communication: If a  = RepC then go to step 3f; else
do for all C∗ ∈C r,C∗  = C:
(a) send   lworthC(C ∪ C∗) to RepC∗
(b) receive   lworthC∗(C ∪ C∗) from RepC∗
(c) compute   v(C ∪ C∗)=   lworthC(C ∪ C∗) ⊕
  lworthC∗(C ∪ C∗)
2. Proposal Generation
(a) CandC :=
 
C∗
   
 C ∈C\C, (  g(C,C ∪ C∗,  v)  ◦  0) ≥ t
 
(b) If CandC  = ∅, send proposal to RepC+
of most beneﬁcial C+ to form joint coali-
tion C ∪ C+. In case of multiple possi-
ble choices, uniquely select best representative
o(RepC∪C+)=m i n {o(RepC∗)|   ge v(C,C∪C+)
∈ maxe ◦{  ge v(C,C ∪ C∗∗)|C∗∗ ∈ CandC}}
(c) Receive all proposals from all other
RepC∗,C ∗ ∈C r,C∗  = C
3. Coalition Forming
(a) Set New:= ∅ and Obs := ∅
(b) If a proposal was sent to as well as received from
C+ , form joint coalition C ∪ C+:i. If o(RepC) <o (RepC+) then
RepC∪C+ := RepC else RepC∪C+ :=
RepC+
ii. inform all other RepC∗,C ∗ ∈C r,C∗  =
C,C∗  = C+ and all a∗ ∈ C, a  =
RepC about the newly formed coalition and
RepC∪C+
iii. New := {C ∪ C+}, Obs := {C,C+},
CandC := ∅
(c) Receive all messages about new coalition. For
each new coalition C1 ∪ C2 and RepC1∪C2 do:
CandC := CandC \{C1,C 2}, New:= New∪
{C1 ∪ C2}and Obs := Obs ∪{ C1,C 2}.
(d) If no new coalition was formed, go to step 2b.
(e) Send the sets Newand Obs to all other coalition
members a∗ ∈ C, a  = RepC
(f) If a  = RepC then receive sets New and Obs
from RepC.
(g) Set r := r +1 , Cr := (Cr−1 \ Obs) ∪ New, and
ur according to recursive fuzzy bilateral Shapley
value based on the coalition structures Cr ...C0.
(h) If Cr = Cr−1then stop; else go to step 1
Proposition 3.2 Between step 2.b and 3.c in any
round r ∈ N, the coalition C1 ∪ C2, C1,C 2 ∈C r,
which is among the overall most proﬁtable coali-
tions in the sense that   ge v(C1,C 1 ∪ C2) ∈
maxe ◦ {  ge v(C,C ∪ C∗∗) |C ∈C r,C∗∗ ∈ CandC }, and
o(RepC1∪C2) is minimal as compared to o of other overall
most proﬁtable coalitions, is formed, or no proposals are
sent at all.
Proof: Because of lemma 2.16, we have that if C1 ∪ C2
is in the set CandC1, it is also in the set CandC2. From
the properties of   ≥P,   ≥N,   >P and   >N discussed in [6], it
is clear that for a set of fuzzy quantities X,i fF1 ∈ X:
F1 ∈ maxGX,thenalsoF1 ∈ maxGY ⊆ X withF1 ∈ Y .
Further,   ge v(C1,C 1 ∪ C2)=  ge v(C2,C 1 ∪ C2) because of
lemma 2.16. Thus, with (a) it follows that   ge v(C1,C 1 ∪
C2) ∈ maxe ◦ {  ge v(Ci,C i ∪ C∗∗) |C∗∗ ∈ CandCi } for
both i =1and i =2 . With the unambiguousness of the
agent ordering o and (b), it is then clear that in step 2.b C1
and C2 send proposals to each other and thus form C1 ∪C2
in step 3.c. 
Lemma 3.3 In round r ∈ N, the iteration between step 2.b
and 3.d is done at most
|Cr|
2 times by each agent.
Proof: Assume there have been k ∈ N iterations in a given
round of the BSCA-F and l ∈ N new coalitions have been
formed. Then proposition 3.2 implies that k ≤ l. Step
3.b.iii implies that every coalition can merge with another
one only once in each round of the BSCA-F, and thus limits
the overall number of new coalitions per round to at most
|Cr|
2 .S ow eh a v ek ≤ l ≤
|Cr|
2 . 
Lemma 3.4 The BSCA-F terminates after at most |A|
rounds.
Proof: In each non-ﬁnal round r ∈ N of the BSCA-F at
least one new coalition may form, i.e. |C|r+1 ≤| C | r − 1.
Thus, after |A| − 1 rounds, we have |C||A|−1 ≤ 1, which
means that the BSCA-F terminates in round |A|. 
Theorem 3.5 The worst-case runtime of the BSCA-F for
each agent is in O(|A|4) assuming constant time for op-
erations on fuzzy quantities.
Proof: In step 2.b, each C has to ﬁnd the (crisp) maxi-
mum set of the fuzzy gains for coalitions in CandC, with
|CandC|≤| C r|. From deﬁnitions 2.6 and ?? it follows
that this can be done in O(|Cr|2). Because all other individ-
ual operations are of less complexity and with lemma 3.3,
the iteration between step 2.b and 3.d thus is in O(|Cr|3).
Since |Cr|≤| A |and lemma 3.4, the overall runtime of the
BSCA-F is then O(|A|4). 
Theorem 3.6 The total number of messages sent by agents
using the BSCA-F for coalition negotiation is O(|A|2).
Proof: In each round r ∈ N, each representative of a coali-
tion C sends |Cr|−1 messages in step 1.a, a single pro-
posal message in 2.b, at most one time |Cr|−2 messages
in step 3.b.ii and |C|−1 messages in step 3e. So the num-
ber of messages per representative per round is bound by
|C| ≤ |A|. The number of messages sent by the |A| − |C|
non-representatives is zero. So with lemma 3.4, the overall
number of messages sent is lower or equal |A|2. 
Coalition negotiation using the BSCA-F yields a coalition
structure C with recursively fuzzy bilateral Shapley value
stable payoff distribution. Since theses fuzzy payoffs origi-
nate from the fuzzy coalition values of coalitions in C only
(all other fuzzy coalition values are defuzziﬁed by use of
the possibilistic mean value) we have to defuzzify the val-
ues of exactly these coalitions in C only. It appears plau-
sible that the real coalition values become known to the
correspondingcoalition members after their coalitions have
been formed and contracted actions are carried out. Oth-
erwise, we may also use the possibilistic mean to derive at
least a reasonable expectation of them. Thus, in both cases,
we may obtain crisp coalition values for all coalitions in C,
hence crisp payoffs.
4 Example Application
4.1 Deﬁnition of the Game
In the following, we demonstrate how the BSCA-F could
be applied to negotiate economically rational coalitions ofCat. M1 M2 M3 M4
a) politics column column 1 photo mag
b) feature sect. travel mag column 2 feature sect.
Table 1. Content provided by magazines
I1 e A1
. I2 e A2
.
M2 a) (   2.4,3.6,4.2,4.8) M1 a) (   8.4,12,14.4,16.8)
M2 b) (   1.08,1.2,1.56,1.8) M3 a) (   6.6,7.2,7.8,8.4)
M3 a) (   9.6,12,14.4,15.6) M4a) (   6,9,9.333,10)
M4 a) (   3.6,7.2,12.8,16.4)
I3 e A3
. I4 e A4
.
M2 b) (   13.2,14.4,15,15.6) M1 b) (   3.6,3.72,4.08,4.2)
M2 b) (   7.2,7.56,10,12.5)
Table 2. Additional income per category
onlinemagazinesin the Internet. Consider fouronline mag-
azines, M1 − M4, that are interested in exchanging content
for different reasons such as customer recruitment. Sup-
pose that each of them is reluctant to provide more con-
tent to potential partners than it would obtain in return for
a certain payoff, hence agrees to contribute only two cat-
egories of the content to the coalition it participates in ta-
ble 1). Content is provided to coalition partners on a daily
basis, whereas coalition contracts in total will hold for one
yearafterwhichnegotationmayberestarted. Topreventan-
titrust matters, coalitions with more than three members are
ruled out. Each magazine Mi is represented by an agent
ai which carries out negotiation on behalf of Mi. Each
magazine Mi would publish only such content provided by
coalition partners which is in line with the general style of
Mi. The set of categories Mi is interested in is called Ii.
For each x ∈ Ii, Mi fuzzily estimates the number   Ai
x of
additional accesses for one year it can achieve by publish-
ing x. For simplicity, we assume these estimations are in-
dependent of each other. The sets Ii and estimations   Ai
x
(in thousands) are given in table 2. Any single access to
content of a magazine Mi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, is subject to a
given price Pi (in Euros) determined by Mi. The prices
are P1 := 2, P2 := 1.5, P3 := 1.8 and P4 := 2.0. The ad-
ditional income produced by a magazine Mi by coalescing
with a magazine Mk is
 ⊕
Mkx)∈Ii
  Ai
Mkx)   Pi, and the to-
tal additional income   aii(C) for Mi in coalition C is given
with   aii(C)=
 ⊕
Mk∈C,k =i
 ⊕
Mkx)∈Ii
  Ai
Mkx) Pi M1 and
M2 arguably have the best cooperation opportunities in this
game. On the cost side, we consider only volume-based
transfer costs (in Euros) with given transfer price Ti per
MB depending on the internet connection of magazine M i.
The costs are T1 := 0.02, T2 := 0.01, T3 := 0.025 and
T4 := 0.012. Based on experiences in the past, each Mi
estimates the amount of data Vx it would need to transfer
VM.a) VM.b)
M1 (   12,18,24,42) (   6,12,30,60)
M2 (   1.2,3.6,6,7.2) (   96,120,156,204)
M3 (   3.6,8.4,12,14.4) (   2.4,3.6,4.2,5.4)
M4 (   180,192,204,216) (   18,24,30,36)
Table 3. Amount of category data (in 100MB)
C   v(C)
a1,a 2 (   38060,48552,60739,70454)
a1,a 3 (   18835,23789,28674,31128)
a1,a 4 (   13338,20976,33022,40552)
a2,a 3 (   32967,36185,38293,40370)
a2,a 4 (   19010,22932,32981,39114)
a3,a 4 (   −815,−751,−684,−612)
a1,a 2,a 3 (   89564,108332,127576,141865)
a1,a 2,a 4 (   69646,91830,126204,149649)
a1,a 3,a 4 (   30690,43458,60529,70642)
a2,a 3,a 4 (   50331,57648,69967,78328)
others (  0)
Table 4. Coalition values (rounded)
per category x during one year as shown in table 3. Every
magazine Mi has to pay for both incoming and outgoing
trafﬁc, means (VMia) ⊕ VMib) ⊕ VMka) ⊕ VMkb))   Ti for
data transmitted to/from each coalition partner Mk. Hence,
the total cost   ci(C) for Mi in coalition C is   ci(C)=  ⊕
Mk∈C,k =i(VMia)⊕VMib)⊕VMka)⊕VMkb)) Ti. Having
both total additional income and costs for each magazine
Mi in a coalition C, we obtain their local worth individu-
ally by   lworthai(C)=   aii(C)   ci(C), and resulting fuzzy
coalition values (cf. table 4.
4.2 Negotiation with the BSCA-F
For this example, we select the necessity of dominance
  ≥N as fuzzy ranking operator, and o(ai): =i for agent
ordering. In the ﬁrst round, in step 2a, all coalitions
prefer each other except of a3 ∪ a4 which is clearly a
non-proﬁtable coalition. Both a1 and a2 mutually pro-
pose a1 ∪ a2 to each other as the most proﬁtable joint
coalition with payoff half of the coalition value:   u(a1)
=   u(a2)= 1
2  0 ⊕ 1
2((   38060,48552,60739,70454)     0)
=(   19030,24276,30369.5,35227). In the second round,
a1 ∪ a2 sends a proposal to a3 rather than a4 according
to   ≥N with e(  v({a1,a 2})= 38060+48552+60739+70454
4
= 54451,   ge v(a1 ∪ a2,(a1 ∪ a2) ∪ a3)=
1
2(  v({a1,a 2,a 3})   e(  v({a1,a 2})   e(  v({a3}))= 1
2((   89564,108332,127576,141865)   54451   0)
=(   17556,26940,36562,43706) =   ge v(a3,(a1 ∪ a2) ∪ a3)
(cf. lemma 2.16). Similarily,   ge v(a1 ∪ a2,(a1 ∪ a2) ∪ a4)
=   ge v(a4,(a1 ∪ a2) ∪ a4)=(   7597,18689,35876,47599)
Please note that with >P, the choice would have been a4.
The payoff of the new coalition is distributed as follows:
  u(a1)=  u(a2)=  σe
b(a1∪a2,a 1,   σe
b(C∗,a 1∪a2,   v(C∗)))
= 1
2(1
2e(  v(a1∪a2)) ⊕1
2((   89564,108332,127576,141865)
 0)) = (   17556,26940,36562,43706). In the third round,
the BSCA-F terminates, since the value of the grand
coalition is zero, thus is not a candidate for anyone.
4.3 Defuzziﬁcation
Since coalition contracts, in this example, are valid
for one year, there are two options to determine the real
coalition values: Either wait for one year and then ana-
lyze the additional income and the costs that were real-
ized in the period; or defuzzify the coalition values just
when negotiations are ﬁnished, using the possibilistic mean
value. Due to space limitations, we only discuss the sec-
ond case for the coalition C∗ := {a1,a 2,a 3} formed,
and the possibilistic mean value of   v(C∗): e(  v(C∗)) =
89564+108332+127576+141865
4 = 116834. Computing the re-
cursive bilateral Shapley value with e(  v(C∗)), we obtain
u(a1)=u(a2) = 42821, which is equal to e(  u(a1))(=
e(  u(a2)) due to the additivity of e. Similarily, it holds that
u(a3)=e(  u(a3)) = 31192. To summarize, when negotia-
tions are ﬁnished, the agent have to compute the possibilis-
tic mean values of the fuzzy payoffs only. this yields the
same result as if they would compute the recursively bilat-
eral Shapley value stable payoffs for the possibilistic mean
of the coalition values. The resulting payoffs appear to be
intuitivelysound,sincea1 anda2, theagentswith mostben-
eﬁcial cooperation opportunities, are assigned more payoff
than a3. Further, let us consider computing the fuzzy pay-
offs by recursively applying the non-defuzzyfyingfuzzy bi-
lateral Shapley value as deﬁned in ?? instead. This means
that the fuzzy payoffs now also contain the fuzzyness of the
values of the subcoalitions. Then we obtain the fuzzy pay-
offs   u∗(a1)=  σb(a1 ∪ a2,a 1,   σb(C∗,a 1 ∪ a2,   v(C∗)))
=(   31906,39221,47079,53080) (=   u∗(a2)) and   u∗(a3)
=   σb(C∗,a 3,   v(C∗))) = (   9555,23797,39512,51903).
5 Conclusions
We presented a new low-complexity coalition forming
algorithm, BSCA-F, that enables agents to negotiate bilat-
eral Shapley value stable coalitions in uncertain environ-
ments, and demonstrated it by example. In particular, we
showed that utilizing the possibilistic mean value for de-
fuzzifying negotiated fuzzy agent payoffs appears reason-
able. However, the choice of the fuzzy ranking operator is
supposed to be equal for each agent; future work includes
relaxation of this requirement.
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